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While many nations face environmental degradation due to the ac-
tions of other sovereign countries, one nation faces total destruction. The
Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) literally may disappear due to
accelerated sea-level rise.' Nearly a decade ago, scientists predicted that
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sity, May 1991. The author would like to extend special thanks to Professor Gennady M.
Danilenko, Holly Barker, and the Michigan Journal of International Law, especially to editors
Jasmine Abdel-khalik and Brandon Johnson. Responsibility for the views and opinions ex-
pressed in this Note belong to the author alone.
1. See, e.g., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group II, The Re-
gional Impacts of Climate Change: An Assessment of Vulnerability, Summary for
Policymakers, Special Report, pt. 6.8 (Robert T. Watson et al. eds., Nov. 1997)
<http://www.ipcc.chlpub/sr97.htm> [hereinafter Regional Impacts].
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accelerated sea-level rise, if not halted, will make the Marshall Islands
uninhabitable.2 In 1997, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) concluded that accelerated sea-level rise may require the
evacuation of low-lying island nations like the Marshall Islands! While
diplomatic efforts are underway to stop the global warming that causes
accelerated sea-level rise, these efforts are proving insufficient. This
Note identifies three strategies that, either jointly or independently, may
assist RMI in attaining a remedy for the destruction of their nation.
This Note first describes the threat posed by accelerated sea-level
rise. A review of scientific data shows that global warming causes ocean
levels to rise and that RMI may need to be evacuated. The current dip-
lomatic efforts to decrease global warming offer few assurances to RMI.
In fact, the countries that have obligated themselves to reduce global
warming are actually increasing emissions of gases that cause global
warming.
This paper identifies three legal theories under which RMI can
obtain relief for the injuries that accelerated sea-level rise may cause.
First, the signatories of United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) are obligated to provide relief for RMI
and other nations affected by accelerated sea-level rise. RMI should
immediately attempt to enforce this obligation. If RMI's requests for
relief under the UNFCCC are denied, then RMI can seek a judgment
against the offending nations in the International Court of Justice
(ICJ). Second, RMI can bring a claim in the ICJ for a breach of cus-
tomary international law. Third, RMI can seek relief from the world's
leading producer of greenhouse gases. A treaty obligation exists be-
tween RMI and the United States, which, broadly interpreted, may
require the United States to defend RMI from accelerated sea-level
2. See MARTHA J. CRAWFORD, SOUTH PACIFIC REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME,
REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT STRAT-
EGY: STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT REPORT 1992 PART A 22-23 (1993). See also Possible
Adverse Effects of Sea-Level Rise on Islands and Coastal Areas, Particularly Low-Lying
Coastal Areas, G.A. Res. 206, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 85th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/206 (1989). The United Nations conducted the 1985 Villach Conference to address
the Greenhouse Effect. See DEAN EDWIN ABRAHAMSON, THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL
WARMING 63-67 (1989).
3. See Regional Impacts, supra note 1, pt. 6.8. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) was established by the United Nations Environment Programme and the
World Meteorological Organization in 1988. See id. Foreword. This IPCC report was pre-
pared specifically for the conference of the parties to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change. See id. pt. 1.
4. See United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S.
TREATY DOC. No. 102-38 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992)[hereinafter UNFCCC].
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rise. This paper concludes with some proposals on how best to enforce
the three legal obligations outlined.
I. THE THREAT OF ACCELERATED SEA-LEVEL RISE
AND THE MARSHALL ISLANDS
A. The Republic of the Marshall Islands Is Especially
Vulnerable to Accelerated Sea-level Rise
In 1997, the IPCC identified the Marshall Islands as one of the na-
tions especially vulnerable to the threat of accelerated sea-level rise due,
in part, to their geography.5 RMI has a total of five islands and twenty-
nine atolls that contain over a thousand islets.6 While numerous, the is-
lands and islets possess little land mass. In total, 70.05 miles of dry land
exist amidst over 750,000 square miles of the Pacific Ocean.7 The largest
land mass in the Marshall Islands is an atoll just over six square miles in
size.'
Though RMI is situated in the middle of open ocean, it barely breaks
the surface of the water. The average land elevation is only seven feet
above sea-level.9 The IPCC estimates that a one meter increase in sea-
level would threaten to submerge 80 percent of the Majuro atoll in the
Marshall Islands," where nearly half of the population lives."
The threat to RMI does not come from total submersion alone. The
RMI government notes that its population is more immediately threat-
ened by the loss its reefs.
Fragile coral reefs fringe the atolls, and serve as the only line of
defense against the ocean surge. The clearance over the reef in
the sections that are covered by water is usually no more than a
couple of feet. In other places the reef is commonly only barely
submerged.... The vulnerability to waves and storm surges is at
the best of times precarious.... The relative safety that the is-
lands have historically provided is now in jeopardy.... It is
5. See Regional Impacts, supra note 1, pt. 6.8 (identifying the same risk for the Baha-
mas, Kiribati and the Maldives).
6. See THE OFFICE OF PLANNING AND STATISTICS, MARSH. Is., MARSHALL ISLANDS
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1996 3 (1996) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
7. See id. at 3-4.
8. See id. at4.
9. See id. at 3.
10. See Regional Impacts, supra note 1, pt. 6.8. The IPCC estimates a sea-level rise of
15-95 cm by the year 2100. See id. pt. 2.
11. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 6, at 16.
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likely that evacuation would have to be effected long before in-
undation is total.'
2
The IPCC notes that coral reefs will be damaged by any rise in tem-
perature. 3 In general, reefs serve as the habitat for marine species,
protect small island nations from erosion and storms, and absorb carbon
dioxide from the atmosphere.14 In addition, coral reefs are a home to the
fish that provide the Marshallese with much of their protein needs.' 5 In-
creased temperature hinders coral reefs from growing and keeping pace
with the rising ocean level, thereby putting the Marshall Islands at risk.6
Accelerated sea-level rise is not merely a theoretical prediction.
Some claim that the effects of sea-level rise can already be seen
throughout the Marshall Islands. For example, during World War H, the
Japanese military constructed island defense bunkers. 7 The bunkers
stood on the beaches approximately one hundred yards from the water
line.' Today, many bunkers stand in several feet of ocean water.' 9 An-
other image clearly foreshadows the future of the Marshall
Islands. Rising water has partially covered a cemetery; the top of
bleached white grave markers, once on dry land, now just break the sur-
face of brilliant crystal blue water. °
To further complicate matters, the usable dry land is limited, and the
population pressures are significant and growing. The current population
is approximately 58,000" and growing at a rate of 4.3% per annum.22
The UNFPA Country Support Team for the South Pacific considers RMI
12. The Marshall Islands and Climate Change (visited April 7, 1999)
<http://www.rmiembassyus.org/climate.html>.
13. See generally William C. Bums, Global Warming-The United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change and the Future of Small Island States, 6 DICK. J. ENv. L. POL.
147, 169 (1997).
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See Regional Impacts, supra note 1, pt. 6.8.
17. See Telephone Interview with Holly Barker, Ph.D., Spokesperson for the RMI Em-
bassy to the United States (Apr., 1999) [hereinafter Barker].
18. See id.
19. See id. Pictures of the bunkers appear surrounded by water in a travel brochure to
RMI. See Office of Resources & Development, Marsh. Is., UNTITLED TRAVEL BROCHURE 2
(photo by Bert Sagara).
20. See Barker, supra note 17.
21. See The Embassy of Marsh. Is., RMI Online (last modified Mar. 18, 2000) <http://
www.rmiembassyus.org> [hereinafter RMI Online].
22. See OFFICE OF PLANNING AND STATISTICS, MARSH. Is., REPORT ON THE PROCEED-
INGS OF NATIONAL SEMINAR ON POPULATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT; MAJURO, JULY 10-12,
1995 18 (1995).
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crowded by world standards.23 The average population density is over
600 persons per square mile,' and certain parts are significantly more
crowded. While efforts to control population growth are underway, the
pressure on existing usable land is likely to increase in the future.26
RMI has few options to save its population. In fact, the IPCC sug-
gests that, while some "adaptation strategies are theoretically possible[,]
[o]n some small, low-lying island states and atolls ... retreat away from
the coasts is not an option. In some extreme cases, migration and reset-
tlement outside of national boundaries might have to be considered. 27
Thus, in the worst case scenario, RMI could suffer profound impacts
including a substantial disappearance of their land mass.28
Since retreat away from the coasts is not an option for the Mar-
shallese, the remedy required to combat accelerated sea-level rise is as
dramatic as the threat. RMI needs funding to relocate its population to
new sovereign territory. Further, the hardship imposed by relocation
should be compensated. Such funding would be extraordinary, but in-
deed, so is the loss anticipated by the Marshallese.
Relocation to new sovereign territory presents logistical challenges
that some claim are insurmountable." Yet, alternative remedies are far
more improbable. For example, a global injunction on greenhouse gas
emissions is not feasible because much of the world's economy is de-
pendent upon the emission of greenhouse gases.30 The continuing
increase of greenhouse gas emissions confirms the impracticability of
enjoining such emissions. Therefore, despite the onerous nature of
evacuation funding, RMI should considered it as a potential legal rem-
edy.
23. See Laurie Lewis, Office of Planning and Statistics, People Count, in REPUBLIC OF
THE MARSHALL ISLANDS REPORT ON THE PROCEEDINGS OF NATIONAL SEMINAR ON POPULA-
TIONS AND DEVELOPMENT; MAJURO, JULY 10-12, 1995 89 (1995).
24. See id.
25. Consider the islet of Ebeye; while its land mass is only 0.14 of a mile, it has over
8,000 residents. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 6, at 17. "This is equivalent to a
density of about 60,000 persons in a square mile." Lewis, supra note 23, at 89.
26. See Lewis, supra note 23, 89-90.
27. Regional Impacts, supra note 1, pt 6.8 (emphasis added).
28. See generally id.
29. While the population of RMI is significant, its size can be placed into perspective
with the following comparison. The entire population of the Marshall Islands would fill just
over half of the football stadium at the University of Michigan (capacity of approximately
107,500). See RMI Online, supra note 21; M Go Blue: Michigan Stadium (last modified Jul.
22, 1999) <http://www.mgoblue.com/campusinfo/michigan-stadium.html>.
30. See Jennifer Woodward, Turning Down the Heat: What the United States Laws Can
Do to Help Ease Global Warming, 39 AM. U.L. REV. 203, 207-08 (1989).
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B. Greenhouse Gases, Global Warming, Sea-level
Rise and the World Response
In 1990, the president and director of the Woods Hole Research
Center in Massachusetts, Dr. George M. Woodwell, predicted a sea-level
rise of approximately 20 centimeters by the year 2030. 3' The IPCC pre-
dicts a rise of 15-95 cm by the year 2100.32 These figures are hotly
debated; Woodwell noted that the high-end estimates suggest a sea-level
rise of as much as 5 meters by the end of the next century.3 Natural sea-
level rise is a minimal component of any predicted increase." Collective
global emissions of greenhouse gases cause acceleration beyond natural
levels.3 The science is, by now, familiar. Greenhouse gases are emitted
by burning fossil fuels, among other methods. These gases build up in
the atmosphere and prevent solar radiation from escaping the earthy.
This causes temperatures to increase.38 Subsequently, the oceans rise in
two ways. First, an increase in temperature causes thermal expansion,
increasing the volume of the seawater itself.39 Second, and more signifi-
cantly, an increase in temperature will melt the polar icecaps, increasing
the amount of water in the oceans.4
Several greenhouse gases (GHGs) contribute to the rise of global
temperature; these gases include carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4),
and nitrous oxide (N20). 41 The most important of these is CO2 since it is
and will continue to be the most significant contributor to global warm-
ing. 2 The IPCC reports that CO2 emissions, at historical rates of fossil
fuel consumption, cement production, and deforestation, "will increase
31. See George M. Woodwell, The Effects of Global Warming, in GLOBAL WARMING:
THE GREENPEACE REPORT 117, 127-28 (Jeremy Leggett ed., 1990).
32. See Regional Impacts, supra note 1, pt. 6.8.
33. See Woodwell, supra note 31, at 127-28.
34. See, e.g., Daniel B. Botkin, Global Warming: What is It, What is Controversial
About It, and What We Might Do In Response to It, 9 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 119, 134-
36 (1991).
35. See id.
36. See Jeremy Leggett, Global Warming: The Scientific Evidence and its Implications 2
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1,4 (1992).
37. See id. at 3-6.
38. See id.
39. See LYNNE T. EDGERTON, NATIONAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, THE RISING
TIDE: GLOBAL WARMING AND WORLD SEA LEVELS 19 (1991).
40. See id. For a discussion on the impacts of climate change on the Arctic, see Harvey
A. Buckmaster, The Arctic-A Canadian Case Study, in THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT 61
(Harold Coward & Thomas Hurka eds., 1993).
41. See Woodward, supra note 30, at 203.
42. See David Schimel et al., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working
Group I, Stabilization of Atmospheric Greenhouse Gases: Physical, Biological and Socio-
economic Implications, Technical Paper III, 3 (John T. Houghton et al. eds., Feb. 1997).
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atmospheric concentrations of this greenhouse gas. ' 43 However, after
years of study, even the IPCC is not sure how much of a reduction in
GHG emissions is necessary to halt accelerated sea-level rise.
The ultimate concentration of greenhouse gases reached in the
atmosphere, as well as the speed at which concentrations in-
crease, is likely to influence impacts [on environmental
systems], because a slower rate of climate change will allow
more time for systems to adapt. However, knowledge is not cur-
rently sufficient to identify clear threshold rates and magnitudes
of change."
While generalizations are made about the importance of reducing
GHG emissions, no consensus exists on how much of a reduction would
be sufficient.45 There is no doubt, however, that some level of reduction
is necessary.
The concern over the impact of GHG emissions prompted the inter-
national community to adopt the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC). RMI was the third nation to sign and
ratify the UNFCCC," which entered into force on March 21, 1994.47 As
of December 1999, 181 nations had ratified the UNFCCC . While the
UNFCCC itself does not require member states to reduce GHG emis-
sions, it does create a special obligation on behalf of certain member
states towards RMI and other similarly situated island nations.49 This
obligation is first recognized in the preamble, which states that "low-
lying and other small island countries ... are particularly vulnerable to
the adverse effects of climate change."50
The first protocol restricting GHG emissions was drafted in Decem-
ber of 1997." Under the Kyoto Protocol (Protocol), which quantifies the
43. Id. at 7.
44. Id. at 5.
45. See Gus Speth, Foreword to FRANCESCA LYMAN ET AL., THE GREENHOUSE TRAP:
WHAT WE'RE DOING TO THE ATMOSPHERE AND How WE CAN SLOW GLOBAL WARMING iX
(1990). Some sources claim climate change is virtually irreversible. See id.
46. See United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Change: Marshall Islands
(visited Mar. 30, 2000) <http://www.unfccc.de/text/resource/country/mi.html>[hereinafter
Marshall Islands Information].
47. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Signatories and
Ratification of the Convention, Parties in Chronological Order-Update on Ratification of the
Convention (visited Mar. 30, 2000) <http://www.unfccc.de/resource/conv/raflist.pdf>.
48. See Marshall Islands Information, supra note 46.
49. See id.
50. UNFCCC, supra note 4, Preamble.
51. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: The Convention and
the Kyoto Protocol-Status of Signatories to the Kyoto Protocol (visited Mar. 30, 2000)
<http://www.unfccc.de/resource/convkp.html>.
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need to reduce GHG emissions,52 member states of the UNFCCC who
both sign and ratify the Protocol obligate themselves to reduce collective
emissions by at least 5% below 1990 levels by the year 2012."3 While 84
countries have signed, only twenty-two have ratified the Protocol. 4
Yet despite diplomatic progress towards reducing GHG emissions,
the reality behind the agreements is bleak. Annex I to the UNFCCC lists
nations who, as industrialized countries, have special obligations to con-
trol GHG emissions.55 Data released in November of 1998 from the
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC shows that Annex I Nations,
with one exception, are increasing their aggregate amount of GHG emis-
sions.5 6 Both short- and long-term measures show the increase of GHG
emissions.57 Not only have Annex I Nations increased GHG emissions
from 1990 to 1996, but from 1995 to 1996, GHG emissions increased by
the largest amount.58 Therefore, while it seems that the global commu-
nity acknowledges the global warming crisis, as of yet there are no
substantive reductions in GHG emissions. In fact, those nations pur-
ported to be leaders in reducing GHG emissions actually are increasing
their GHG emissions.
C. The Political and Governmental Structure
of the Marshall Islands
RMI's legal options depend, in part, on some features of its unique
governmental and political structure. It is therefore important to outline a
few of the more significant aspects.
From 1947 until 1986, the United States administered a Trusteeship
over the Marshall Islands. 9 In 1986 a "Compact of Free Association"
became effective between the Marshall Islands and the United States,
52. See id.; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Guide to the Climate
Change Negotiation Process: The Climate Change Convention (visited Mar. 30, 2000) <http://
www.unfc.de/resource/process/components/responserespconv.hmil> [hereinafter Guide].
53. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 12, 1997, art. 3(1), 37 I.L.M. 22, 33 (1998)[hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
54. See United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Change: Kyoto Protocol
Status of Ratification (last modified on Jan. 13, 2000) <http://www.unfccc.de/resource/
kpstats.pdf>[hereinafter Kyoto Status].
55. See Guide, supra note 52.
56. Latvia is the only Annex I country to report reductions in GHG emissions. See Sum-
mary Compilation of Annual Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventory Data From Annex I
Parties, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Par-
ties, 4th Sess., Agenda Item 4(a)(I), at 7, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1998/Inf.9 (1998)[hereafter
COP].
57. See Clare Breidenich et al., Current Development: The Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 92 A.J.I.L. 315, 316 (1998).
58. See id.
59. See id. at 4; H.R. REP. No. 99-188, pt. 1, at 3 (1985).
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enabling RMI to operate as "a free and sovereign nation. ' RMI took
another step toward international independence in September of 1991
when it became a member state of the United Nations.61
Despite RMI's independent status, the "Compact of Free Associa-
tion" (Compact) maintains the close ties between RMI and the United
States. Examples of these close ties are numerous. Although it is a sov-
ereign nation, RMI can participate in domestic United States programs.62
Under the Compact, the United States pays RMI millions of dollars in
compensation for damage caused by nuclear testing.63 Congress also
authorized technical assistance aid in 19 82 .6' The provision of the Com-
pact most relevant to the success of an RMI request for relief is the
United States obligation to provide for RMI's defense.6"
While it is a small nation with limited international influence, RMI
has a surprisingly prominent place in the ongoing negotiations regarding
climate change. RMI is a Member State and an active participant in both
the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. Additionally, RMI is represented
and attends all meetings of the Association of Small Islands States.6
RMI's significant presence in this regional organization gives it the bar-
gaining power it will need to utilize in the legal remedies outlined
below.67
H. INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS PROVIDING RMI WITH LEGAL
REMEDIES FOR ACCELERATED SEA-LEVEL RISE
A. The Potential Defendants
The most fundamental difficulty with any legal remedy for acceler-
ated sea-level rise is assigning responsibility. The entire global
community, as producers of GHG, is responsible for accelerated
sea-level rise. Therefore, identifying the party or parties to select as de-
fendant(s) poses a difficult problem since no single defendant nor group
of defendants is entirely responsible for the accelerated sea-level rise
60. OFFICE OF PLANNING AND STATISTICS, MARSH. Is., SECOND FIVE YEAR NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1991/92-1995/96 3 (1991)[hereinafter DEVELOPMENT PLAN].
61. See United Nations: Member States of the United Nations (last modified Mar. 10,
2000) <http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html>.
62. See Donald J. Senese, The United States in Micronesia, 18 J, OF Soc., POL. & ECON.
STUD. 418 (1993).
63. See DEVELOPMENT PLAN, supra note 60, at 6.
64. See Senese, supra note 62, at 418.
65. See DEVELOPMENT PLAN, supra note 60, at 4. This provision will be discussed in
greater detail in Part lI.C. See infra pt. lI.C.
66. See Barker, supra note 17; see also Regional Impacts, supra note 1, pt.9.
67. See Barker, supra note 17.
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problem. In light of recent ICJ decisions, however, RMI may select a
representative defendant or group of defendants. These defendants can
be held liable even though they may only be partly responsible for
RMI's injury.
Any defendant selected by RMI will raise jurisdictional objections
similar to those raised by Australia when it was singled out as a defen-
dant in a suit brought by Nauru. In that case, Nauru claimed that
Australia had breached the international obligations it owed as a trus-
tee. Among several jurisdictional challenges, Australia claimed Nauru's
suit was improper because the two other nations who shared trusteeship
duties with Australia were not defendants in the suit.69 Australia con-
tended that if the ICJ were to find Australia had breached its trusteeship
obligation, the ICJ should also find that the other two trustee nations had
breached the same obligation.70 Further, Australia raised the issue
whether any liability for a breach of the trusteeship obligations should be
joint and several or apportioned equally among the three nations.7,
Therefore, Australia argued that the ICJ should not accept jurisdiction
unless all three nations were made party to the suit.
72
The ICJ rejected these jurisdictional objections on two grounds.
First, the Court determined that the question of apportioning liability,
i.e., whether Australia is liable for all, one third, or some other portion,
should be reserved until after the ICJ had considered the merits of the
case. 73 The ICJ stated that the proportion of Australia's liability is
"independent of the question of whether Australia can be sued alone."
74
Second, the ICJ acknowledged its practice, established in Monetary
Gold Removed from Rome in 1943, of rejecting jurisdiction when "the
legal interests of a State not party to the proceedings 'would not only be
affected by a decision, but would form the very subject-matter of the
decision.' ,,7 The ICJ distinguished Nauru's case from Monetary Gold.
In Monetary Gold, the ICJ rejected jurisdiction because, in order to find
liability against the defendant parties, France, Great Britain, Northern
Ireland, and the United States, the ICJ would first have to find wrong-
68. See Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. AustI.), 1992 I.C.J. 240, 243 (June
26).
69. See id. at 255.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 258.
72. See id. at 258-59.
73. See id. at 258.
74. Phosphate Lands in Nauru, 1992 I.C.J. at 258.
75. Id. at 260 (quoting Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 431 (Nov. 26) which itself is quoting Monetary Gold Re-
moved from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. Fr.), 1954 I.C.J. 19, 32 (June 15)).
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doing on behalf of a state not party to the suit, Albania.76 While Albania
had the right to intervene in the suit, the ICJ, unlike some national
courts, could not order joinder of Albania.77 Therefore, the ICJ held that
it did not have jurisdiction; to hold otherwise would require the ICJ to
find wrongdoing against a state that could not present a defense on its
own behalf.8
Unlike Monetary Gold, in Nauru v. Australia the ICJ did not need to
find wrongdoing on behalf of the other Trusteeship nations in order to
find wrongdoing by Australia. 9 Australia's liability was independent of
the liability of the other Trusteeship nations.0 Therefore, the ICJ had
jurisdiction to hear the case because deciding the case did not require the
Court to find wrongdoing by nations that were not present to defend
themselves.8 The ICJ reasoned that
a finding by the [ICJ] regarding the existence of... responsibil-
ity attributed to Australia by Nauru might well have implications
for the legal situation of the two other States concerned, but no
finding in respect of that legal situation will be needed as a basis
for the Court's decision on Nauru's claims against Australia. 2
In the case of RMI, the finding of liability against one state for ac-
celerated sea-level rise might have legal implications for other nations
not made party to the suit. However, the Court need not find any non-
party state liable. Therefore, RMI would likely defeat a jurisdictional
challenge even if RMI selects a single defendant or a representative
group of defendants who are partially responsible for accelerated sea-
level rise.
Assuming that the argument above is successful, at least three fac-
tors should influence RMI's choice of a defendant or group of
defendants. First, the defendant(s) must be at least partially responsible
for accelerated sea-level rise. Second, the defendant(s) must have ac-
cepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. Third the defendant(s)
must not have made a reservation for the particular claim presented here.
RMI can most readily hold responsible those nations who have
knowledge of the harmful effects of GHG and continue to engage in
GHG producing activities. Ideal candidates for defendants are in the
76. See Monetary Gold, 1954 I.C.J. at 30, 32-34.
77. See Phosphate Lands in Nauru, 1992 I.C.J. at 243; see also Military and Paramilitary
Activities In and Against Nicaragua, 1984 I.C.J. at 431.
78. See Monetary Gold, 1954 I.C.J. at 30, 32-33.
79. See Phosphate Lands in Nauru, 1992 I.C.J. at 261-62.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. Id.
Spring 2000]
Michigan Journal of International Law
latest UNFCCC report, which identifies the Annex I Nations who con-
tinue to increase their aggregate GHG emissions. As parties to the
UNFCCC, these nations acknowledge the harmful effects of GHG emis-
sions for member nations like RMI. Despite this information, not only
have these nations failed to stabilize their emissions of GHG, but their
aggregate emissions are increasing. Therefore, UNFCCC Annex I
nations who continue to increase their aggregate GHG emissions are
more likely to be held responsible for the injuries their actions have
caused. 3
The ICJ has jurisdiction only for matters where the member states
consent to ICJ jurisdiction. Only some of the Annex I Nations have
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. According to Article
36(1), a party's consent to jurisdiction can be derived from treaties and
conventions.85 Further, Article 36(2) allows states to accept the compul-
sory jurisdiction of the ICJ via declaration 6 Because of these provisions,
RMI can only choose as defendants Annex I states who continue to in-
crease their GHG emissions and who have also accepted ICJ
jurisdiction. 7 Since nations that accept the compulsory jurisdiction of
the ICJ may do so with reservations, 8 RMI's potential class of defen-
dants is reduced even further. 8
83. See infra tbl. 1, left col.
84. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, as annexed to the Charter of the
United Nations, June 26, 1945, arts. 36(1), 36(2), T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, 1186
[hereinafter ICJ Statute]; see also International Court of Justice, Yearbook [1986-1987] 41
I.C.J.Y.B. 48 (1987)[hereinafter 1986-1987 Yearbook].
85. See ICJ Statute, supra note 84, art 36(1); see also 1986-1987 Yearbook, supra note
84, at 48.
86. See ICJ Statute, supra note 84, art. 36(2); see also Declarations Recognizing as
Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the Court, 49 I.C.J.Y.B. 1994-1995 79 (1995) [hereinafter
Declarations Recognizing Jurisdiction].
87. See infra tbl. 1, middle col.
88. See Gary L. Scott and Craig L. Carr, The ICJ and Compulsory Jurisdiction: The
Case for Closing the Clause, 81 A.J.I.L. 57, passim (1987).
89. See infra tbl. 1, right col.
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TABLE I
Annex I Parties Annex I Parties Annex I Parties
Increasing GHG Accepting ICJ Accepting ICJ
Emissions9°  Jurisdiction Jurisdiction
Without Applicable
Reservation
Australia Australia9  Australian
Austria Austria 93  Austria9
Belgium Belgium 95  Belgium
96
Canada Canada 97  Canada98
Czech Republic
Denmark Denmark" Denmark1'0
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Japan Japan"°' Japan'w
90. See COP, supra note 56, at 7.
91. See Declarations Recognizing Jurisdiction, supra note 86, at 80.
92. See id. Australia's "declaration does not apply to any dispute in regard to which the
parties thereto have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some other method of peaceful
settlement." Id.
93. See id. at 80-81.
94. See id. Austria's "declaration does not apply to any dispute in respect of which the
parties thereto have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to other means of peaceful settle-
ment .... Id.
95. See id. at 82.
96. See id. Belgium's declaration does not apply to disputes before 1948 or to those
where "the parties have agreed or may agree to have recourse to another method of pacific
settlement." Id.
97. See id. at 85.
98. See id. Canada's declaration does not apply, inter alia, to disputes before May 1994
or to "disputes in regard to which the parties have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to
some other method of peaceful settlement." Id.
99. See id. at 87-88.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 95.
102. See id. Japan's declaration applies only to disputes after 1958, to those disputes that
"are not settled by other means of peaceful settlement," or to those disputes not subject to
binding and final arbitration. Id.
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TABLE I CONTINUED
Annex I Parties Annex I Parties Annex I Parties
Increasing GHG Accepting ICJ Accepting ICJ
Emissions Jurisdiction Jurisdiction
Without Applicable
Reservation
Monaco
Netherlands Netherlands'03  Netherlands °4
New Zealand New Zealand'05
Norway Norway36 Norway"
Slovakia
Sweden Sweden'0 8  Sweden ° _
Switzerland Switzerland" °  Switzerland'
United Kingdom United Kingdom 2
United States
As a precondition to any action brought before the ICJ, RMI must
file a declaration accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ."13 If RMI
makes this declaration shortly before it brings suit, defendant nations
may object. For example, the terms of the United Kingdom's and New
Zealand's acceptance of compulsory ICJ jurisdiction state that they will
not honor the jurisdiction of the ICJ if the party bringing the action has
accepted the jurisdiction for the sole purpose of bringing the suit or has
accepted jurisdiction "less than twelve months prior to the filing of the
application. '"' 4 RMI can claim that it is accepting the jurisdiction of the
ICJ as a newly admitted member to the United Nations and that the
proximity to any legal action is just coincidental. This argument would,
103. See id. at 104.
104. See id. Netherlands' declaration is valid for any dispute arising after 1921 and is
not subject to "some other method of pacific settlement." Id.
105. See id. at 104-105.
106. See id. at 106-107.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 115.
109. See id. Sweden's declaration is only valid for disputes arising after 1947. See id.
110. See id. at 116.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 117-118.
113. RMI does not appear in the 1995 Yearbook of the ICJ as a nation who has accepted
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. See id. at 79-119.
114. Id. at 104-05, 117-18.
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of course, be subject to challenge. On the other hand, if RMI were to
accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ now and then follow the recommenda-
tions discussed below, there would be a significant time lag between
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction and any litigation before the
ICJ."5 The time lag would make RMI's claim in the ICJ more tenable
against parties like New Zealand and the United Kingdom." 6
B. Obligations RMI Can Enforce In The ICJ
RMI can bring a claim before the ICJ under two different legal theo-
ries. First, RMI can make a claim against developed nations who are
parties of the UNFCCC for breaching their obligations thereunder.
Similarly, RMI may also bring a claim against Annex I Parties of the
UNFCCC for breaches of international obligations under customary in-
ternational law.
1. Obligations Created By The United Nations
Framework Convention On Climate Change
The UNFCCC provides RMI with a direct avenue for relief. Under
the UNFCCC, RMI can request adaptation funds to cope with the cli-
mate change. "7 RMI should use this provision to request evacuation and
relocation funding.
Article 4 of the UNFCCC establishes a legal obligation for devel-
oped countries to provide for the "costs of adaptation" that RMI requires
to deal with accelerated sea-level rise."' Article 4(4) states that
[t]he developed country Parties ... shall also assist the devel-
oping country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the
adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation
to those adverse effects." 9
The preamble to the UNFCCC defines a "particularly vulnerable coun-
try" as a low-lying or small island country.' ° As a developing island
country that is both small and low-lying, RMI clearly qualifies to receive
assistance from developed nations. Therefore, developed country parties
have an obligation to provide RMI with funding to help RMI adapt to
115. Seeinfrapts.I.B.,ll.C.
116. There may be additional reasons why RMI may choose not to select a particular
nation in the far right hand column of Table 1 as a defendant in any litigation before the ICJ.
However, consideration of RMI's diplomatic relations with these nations is not within the
scope of this paper.
117. See UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 4(4).
118. See id.
119. Id.
120. See UNFCCC, supra note 4, Preamble.
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climate change caused by global warming. Further, all parties who
ratified the UNFCCC treaty thereby accepted this obligation because
Article 24 prohibits any reservations. 2'
Of concern is the amount of funds RMI can expect to receive for ad-
aptation and the degree of causation required to qualify for adaptation
funding. 122 While commentators explain that the significance of Article
4(4) is still unclear, 23 Article 4(4) may still provide RMI with the relief
necessary for evacuation. While it is true that Article 4(4) lacks specific-
ity in identifying the amount of funds that developed nations should
provide for adaptation,' 24 this may actually benefit RMI. Article 4(4) not
only does not require a minimum contribution from participating coun-
tries, it also places no cap on contributions. Because there is no cap,
RMI is free to request a sum large enough to purchase and relocate to
new sovereign territory. Further, Article 4(4) does not establish a mini-
mum level of causation as a prerequisite for the release of adaptation
funds. 5 Thus, RMI can utilize the ambiguity in Article 4(4) to its ad-
vantage by defining how that language should be interpreted.
RMI must act quickly. If another vulnerable nation makes a small
adaptation request prior to RMI's sizable relocation request, it may set a
precedent for providing minimal relief under Article 4(4). The ambiguity
inherent in Article 4(4) is an asset for RMI as long as it can be inter-
preted to provide RMI with a sufficient remedy. As soon as another
interpretation has been accepted, RMI's options may be limited.
The first step, therefore, is for RMI to request adaptation funds from
the UNFCCC. As of this writing in 1999, no requests for adaptation
funds have been made under Article 4(4);26 however, the Alliance of
Small Island States (AOSIS) is encouraging its member states to make
claims for adaptation funds.2 7 RMI should use its leadership role within
the AOSIS to convince other nations that RMI is in a strong position to
121. See id. art. 24.
122. See Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change: A Commentary, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW 210, 220 (Philippe Sands ed.,
1994).
123. See id.
124. Powerful funding mechanisms to assist developing nations control ozone depleting
emissions are found within the Montreal Protocol. See Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-10 (1987), 26 I.L.M.
1541, adjusted and amended, June 29, 1990, S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-4 (1991), 30 I.L.M.
539, adjusted and amended, Nov. 25, 1992, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-9 (1993), 32 I.L.M.
875. However these funding mechanisms have a stringent review process. See EDITH BROWN
WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 651-52 (1998).
125. See UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 4(4).
126. See Barker, supra note 17.
127. See EPSEN RONNEBERG, DRAFT OF AOSIS SUBMISSION ON NON-ANNEX 1 NA-
TIONAL COMMUNICATIONS (Mar. 31, 1999) (copy on file with author).
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establish the significant funding potential of Article 4(4). Indeed, if RMI
is able to secure relocation funding through Article 4(4), other nations
with smaller claims may find it easier to make their claims.
If the UNFCCC were to reject RMI's request for adaptation funds,
RMI would have a cause of action before the ICJ for a breach of a treaty
obligation. This cause of action has two components. First, if the
UNFCCC dismisses RMI's claim for adaptation funds without careful
consideration, this rejection would breach Article 4(8) of the
UNFCCC121 Second, if the request by RMI is given careful considera-
tion by the UNFCCC but relocation funds are denied, this dispute is
within the ICJ's jurisdiction."9 This claim will be particularly strong be-
cause treaties are the most authoritative sources of international
obligations under Article 38(1) of the Statutes of the ICJ 30
2. Obligations Created by Customary International Law
As a second option, RMI can bring a cause of action before the ICJ
for a breach of customary international law.131 Customary international
law subjects to liability Annex I Countries who increase their GHG
emissions because these countries have acknowledged the destructive
impact of GHG emissions. The obligation violated by the defendant par-
ties is based on the principle first recognized in the Trail Smelter
arbitration, which established that
128. In Article 4(8), the UNFCCC requires that
[i]n the implementation of the commitments in this Article, the Parties shall give
full consideration to what actions are necessary under the Convention, including
actions related to funding, insurance and the transfer of technology, to meet the
specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties arising from the adverse
effects of climate change and/or the impact of the implementation of response
measures, especially on:
(a) Small island countries;
Countries with low-lying coastal areas....
UNFCCC, supra note 4, at 858.
129. According to the UNFCCC in Article 14(1) and 14(2), parties to the convention
may declare that the ICJ will resolve any dispute concerning the interpretation or the applica-
tion of the Convention. See UNFCCC, supra note 4, at 867. It is likely, therefore, that some
party states to this Convention have already consented the jurisdiction of the ICJ.
130. See ICJ Statute, supra note 84, art. 38(1). Treaties and international custom are the
primary sources of binding international law. See Mark W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 10-11 (1993). However, the ICJ recognizes judicial decisions and the
writings of scholars as secondary sources. See PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 11 (1992).
131. There is an international wrongful act when "(a) conduct consisting of an action or
omission is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) that conduct constitutes a
breach of an international obligation of the State." Draft Articles on State Responsibility,
Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 10, art. 3, at
59, U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980) [hereinafter Draft Articles on State Responsibility].
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[n]o State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in
such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory
of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is
of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and
convincing evidence.'32
In 1949, the Corfu Channel case affirmed this transboundary pollution
obligation.'33 In 1972, Principle 21 of the Stockholm Convention con-
firmed that each state has "the responsibility to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environ-
ment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction."'3" This language was adopted in 1992 in Principle 2 of the
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.' It appears again in
the preamble of the UNFCCC, establishing the importance of this prin-
ciple in the realm of GHG.
3 6
In the case of RMI, the defendant parties violated the transboundary
pollution obligation by their continued and increasing emissions of
GHG. "Causality, identifying the wrongdoer, proof[,] and measurement
132. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1938, 1965 (1941).
133. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).
134. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June
16, 1972, prin. 21, 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420 [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
135. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, June 13, 1992, prin. 2, 31 I.L.M. 874, 876 (1992) [hereinafter
Rio Declaration].
136. The wide acceptance of the principle espoused in Trail Smelter suggests it is a
norm of jus cogens, a preemptory norm of general international law. See JANIS, supra note
130, at 62-66. Application of jus cogens may be especially appropriate in this case as RMI's
destruction is the ultimate violation of its sovereignty. The importance of this norm in inter-
national law and the degree to which it is being violated may provide the framework of an
obligation erga omnes. See generally MAURIzIo RAGAZZI, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES (1997).
First identified in the 1970 dicta of the Barcelona Traction litigation, erga omnes refers to
an obligation in which all states have a legal interest. See id. at 182. Ragazzi tracks the devel-
opment of erga omnes and suggests that "[n]o State can elude the binding force these
obligations, not only because States recognize that it must be so, but also (and more funda-
mentally) because nobody can claim special exemptions from moral absolutes." Id at 183.
Examples of such obligations lie in genocide and slavery. See id. at 92, 105. While the doc-
trine regarding erga omnes is far from clear, Ragazzi identifies several principles found within
certain obligations erga omnes which can, in turn, be identified in RMI's case. See id. at 215.
Amongst these is the requirement that an obligation erga omnes derive from a norm jus co-
gens (codified in international treaties) and that the obligation reflects our basic moral values.
See id. Therefore, RMI's situation may be ripe for an erga omnes argument. However, be-
cause erga omnes is built from dicta and because that dicta does not directly address an
environmental situation such as that faced herein, developing a separate argument for RMI
under an erga omnes rubric seems a dangerous extension of an already tenuous legal argu-
ment.
[Vol. 21:495
Racing the Rising Tide
of harm" are the elements necessary to impose liability, 3 7 and RMI can
prove each element. Scientific evidence from the IPCC establishes cau-
sality by demonstrating that GHG emissions accelerate sea-level rise.
The UNFCCC reports identify the defendants.' The Annex I Countries
acknowledge the dangers of GHG emissions, and yet they continue to
increase GHG emissions. 39 Further, the reports of the IPCC and
UNFCCC prove the existence of and measure the extent of the harm.'
Finally, the IPCC projects that much of RMI's land may disappear if
GHG emissions continue.'
4
The defendant parties may argue that liability cannot attach because
a clear showing of harm is necessary to attach liability and the harm to
RMI has not yet occurred. This argument will fail for two reasons. First,
there are visible effects of accelerated sea-level rise on the Marshall Is-
lands. 42 Further, anecdotal evidence of the submersion of certain parts of
RMI can be bolstered by quantitative evidence.4 3 Second, the situation
facing RMI is a perfect application of the precautionary principle, ar-
ticulated in numerous international agreements.'" The precautionary
principle enables a country like RMI to request relief even in the absence
of scientific certainty because of the irreversible nature of environmental
damage. RMI clearly cannot wait until the anticipated harm occurs be-
fore it seeks a remedy; by then, RMI will cease to exist.
The defendant party nations can also raise other defenses to RMI's
claims. First, the defendant parties may allege that "the applicable inter-
national rules and standards do not hold [them] responsible when [they
have] taken necessary and practicable measures (i.e. exercised due dili-
gence).' 4'5 As member states to the UNFCCC, these nations may claim
that they are currently using their best efforts to comply with the re-
quirements of the Convention. Though this may seem counter-intuitive
considering the recent data showing increased GHG emissions, the
137. ALEXANDRE Kiss & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 350
(1991).
138. See supra pt. II.A.
139. See id.
140. See supra notes 3 and 56.
141. See Regional Impacts, supra note 1, pts. 2, 6.8.
142. See Barker, supra note 17.
143. One land mass survey was conducted in conjunction with the census of 1988. See,
e.g., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 6, Foreword. Data about the exact amount of dry
land on each of the atolls appears in this survey for 1988. See, e.g., id. Gathering more recent
data regarding the decrease in land mass and other effects of the rising sea-levels would
strengthen RMI's case. For example, RMI may want to perform a current land mass survey. A
survey that allows a comparison of the 1988 and 1999 RMI land mass may have a dramatic
impact, especially if it shows a significant reduction in land mass.
144. See Rio Declaration, supra note 135, prin. 15.
145. Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 137, at 350.
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defendant parties can make this argument under the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties. The Vienna Convention requires all signatories
to the Kyoto Protocol to refrain from acts that would defeat the objective
of the Protocol. 6 The Protocol requires signatories to reduce GHG
emissions by 5% from 1990 GHG levels; however, the parties do not
have to show progress towards meeting this goal until the year 2005.'1
7
Therefore, member states can both increase GHG emissions and argue
that they are in compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. Further, they may
even claim that, as signatories to the Protocol, they are the world leaders
taking responsibility for the damage caused by climate change.
The global community may, because of the permissive language in
the Protocol, tolerate the continued increase in GHG emissions in the
short-term. This tolerance may be due in part to the economic prosperity
derived from the industries generating the bulk of GHG emissions.
However, the global community cannot simultaneously acknowledge the
harmful and permanent effects of these emissions and refuse to pay just
compensation. Commentators support the view that
[c]ertain activities which cause or risk causing harm are not
deemed illegal, because their benefits outweigh the risks of
harm. In such a case, compensation still must be provided the
victims of any substantial harm that occurs. The risk-creating
conduct is permitted, but the victim does not bear the risk of the
injury which results. Instead, a social responsibility is imposed
upon the actor to compensate the victims for harm which occurs
even though the activity is legal.
48
Even if the international community condones the increase in GHG
emissions, RMI still deserves compensation for the injury GHG emis-
sions cause. If the global community profits from GHG emissions, that
same community should compensate RMI for the costs RMI must bear.
Another doctrine in international law may prevent recovery for RMI.
Although GHG emissions from Annex I Parties harm RMI, it is not en-
tirely clear that RMI can assess liability on State entities for these
emissions. Under Article 11 of the International Law Commission Draft
Articles on State Responsibility (ILC Draft), "the conduct of a person or
a group of persons not acting on behalf of the State shall not be consid-
ered as an act of the State under international law."'49 In this case, the
146. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18(a), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 336, 8 I.L.M. 679, 686.
147. See Kyoto Protocol supra note 53, art. 3(2). Most Annex I Parties have signed the
Protocol. See supra note 54.
148. Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 137, at 350-51 (internal citations omitted).
149. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 131, art. 11(1), at 61.
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defendant parties may claim that private industry released the GHG, and,
therefore, the signatory States are not subject to liability.
The theory of State Responsibility can surmount this defense if the
State in question failed to exercise due diligence in regulating private
industry. The Institute of International Law recently proposed a regime
of "Responsibility and Liability for Environmental Damage."15 This re-
gime holds States responsible for the actions of private actors within
their own borders in cases where the state fails to exert "sufficient regu-
latory control over activities within its jurisdiction to meet its
international obligations."'' A State is responsible for GHG emissions
that originate within its borders, regardless of their source, if the State
does not enforce a regulatory regime sufficient to curtail these emis-
sions. The applicable provision provides that:
[f]ailure of the State to enact appropriate rules and controls in
accordance with environmental regimes, even if not amounting
as such to a breach of an obligation, may result in its responsi-
bility if harm ensues as a consequence, including damage caused
by operators within its jurisdiction or control.'52
Under this regime, States who obtain reprieve under Article 11 of the
ILC Draft can still be held responsible for the actions within their bor-
ders that they fail to adequately control.'53
C. The United States' Obligation to Defend RMI
From Accelerated Sea-level Rise
In addition to the above two theories, RMI can pursue one other le-
gal remedy. RMI has a special relationship with the United States that
may compel the United States to combat the effects of accelerated sea-
level rise on RMI. This relationship allows RMI to pursue a remedy
from the United States, which it otherwise might not be able to do. Even
though the United States is a world leader in the production of GHG
150. See Responsibility and Liability Under International Law for Environmental Dam-
age, Institute of International Law, Strasbourg Sess., Sept. 4, 1997, (Francisco Orrego Vicufia,
rapporteur); Francisco Orrego Vicufia, Responsibility and Liability Under International Law
for Environmental Damage Resolution, 1997 INST. INT'L L. art. 1, 4, reprinted in 10 GEO.
INT'L L. REV. 269, 270 (1998)[hereinafter Vicufia].
151. Teresa A. Berwick, Responsibility and Liability for Environmental Damage: A
Roadmapfor International Environmental Regimes, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 257, 258
(1998).
152. See Vicufia, supra note 150, at 270.
153. See BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 130, at 11; See also ICJ Statute, supra note 84,
art. 38(1). While a state may challenge this theory, the ICJ will, at least, consider the views of
international scholars in decisions of international law.
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emissions,15 4 RMI cannot pursue enforcement of international obligations
against the United States as it can for the Annex I Parties identified in
Table 1. The United States does not accept the compulsory jurisdiction
of the ICJ.1
15
The United States has, however, made some reparations for the
harms it has caused.'56 For example, the United States buried and aban-
doned transformers containing PCBs on RMI during its Trusteeship. 7
While not accepting responsibility for the damage this caused, the
United States did agree to clean up some of the waste. 5 1 The United
States cited its good relationship with RMI as the reason for this clean-
up effort.
1 59
RMI can invoke this good relationship to prompt United States as-
sistance in remedying the harm due to accelerated sea-level rise. Under
the Compact between the United States and RMI,' 60 the United States
generally retains the ability to assist in RMI's foreign affairs.'6 ' More
importantly, the United States is affirmatively obligated to defend RMI
and to provide for RMI's general security. 62 Though it is an admittedly
aggressive interpretation of the Compact, RMI can argue that the United
States is obligated to defend it from accelerated sea-level rise. 163
154. See, e.g., Second Compilation and Synthesis of Second National Communications,
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties, 4th
Sess., Agenda Item 4(a)(i), at 10, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1998/lI/Add.2 (1998)(discussing
countries' production of carbon dioxide).
155. See JANIS, supra note 130, at 127-28.
156. For example, during the 1954 nuclear tests conducted by the United States near the
Marshall Islands, a Japanese fishing boat was damaged by nuclear fallout. See KIss & SHEL-
TON, supra note 137, at 360. The Japanese government sought reparations for damage caused
to the "Fukuryu Maru." See id. Although the United States never accepted legal responsibil-
ity, it did pay 2 million dollars. See id. at 360-61.
157. See Hyun S. Lee, Post Trusteeship Environmental Accountability: Case of PCB
Contamination on the Marshall Islands, 26 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 399, 409 (1998).
158. See id. at 400.
159. See id.at410.
160. The Compact of Free Association was signed between the United States, RMI and
the Federated States of Micronesia. See Marian Nash Leich, U.S. Practice, 84 A.J.I.L. 237,
237 (1990); Compact of Free Association, Oct. 10, 1986, U.S.-Marsh. Is., 99 Stat. 1770
[hereinafter Compact].
161. It is generally accepted that the United States may assist RMI in the "area of for-
eign affairs as may be requested and mutually agreed from time to time." Compact, supra
note 160, § 124, at 1802.
162. See Compact, supra note 160, § 311-54, at 1822-26.
163. Any such interpretation requires that the threat to RMI from accelerated sea-level
rise be construed as so significant that it amounts to a security matter, not one that is purely
environmental or might otherwise be contemplated by Article VI of the Compact. See Com-
pact, supra note 160, art. VI, § 161-63. Indeed, the potential destruction of a sovereign state
is inherently tied to that nation's security regardless of the threat's origin.
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This obligation is found in Title Three of the Compact. '" According
to Title Three, the United States has the "full authority and responsibility
for security and defense matters in or relating to the Marshall Islands.' 65
This responsibility includes "the obligation to defend the Marshall
Islands ... and their peoples from attack or threats thereof as the United
States and its citizens are defended .... 166
This provision undoubtedly obligates the United States to defend
RMI from military attack. The United States has sought to ensure secu-
rity in the region of the Marshall Islands and Micronesia since World
War H because the Japanese strike on Pearl Harbor was thought to have
been staged in the Marshall Islands. 67 In the 1980's, President Ronald
Reagan envisioned the Compact as permanently establishing the United
States' presence in the region.'6
The defense and land use provisions of the Compact indefinitely
extend the right of the United States to foreclose access to RMI by third
countries for military purposes.' 69 These provisions enable the United
States to preserve regional security and peace. 70 The military protection
of the Marshall Islands therefore serves the dual purposes of maintaining
U.S. presence in the region and protecting RMI from foreign attack.
However, the language in Section 311 of the Compact allows for a
broader interpretation of the United States' obligation. "' According to
164. See Compact, supra note 160, at 1822-27.
165. Compact, supra note 160, § 31 l(a), at 1822 (emphasis added).
166. Id. § 311(b)(1), at 1822.
167. Some argue that the attack on Pearl Harbor was launched from the Marshall Is-
lands. See Lee, supra note 157, at 403. This prompted the United States to ensure the region
would "not pose a security threat." Id. (citations omitted).
168. See generally S. REP. No. 99-16, at 29 (1985)(letter from President Ronald Reagan
to Congress regarding the Compact of Free Association); Compact, supra note 160,
§ 31 l(b)(2), 315, at 1822, 1823.
169. See S. REp. No. 99-16, at 29; see generally Compact, supra note 160, § 311, at
1822.
170. See S. REP. No. 99-16, at 29.
171. Section 311
(a) The Government of the United States has full authority and responsibility for security
and defense matters in or relating to the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micro-
nesia.
(b) This authority and responsibility includes:
(1) the obligation to defend the Marshall Islands and the Federated States
of Micronesia and their peoples from attack or threats thereof as the
United States and its citizens are defended;
(2) the option to foreclose access to or use of the Marshall Islands and the
Federated States of Micronesia by military personnel or for the military
purposes of any third country; and
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this interpretation, not only must the United States defend RMI from
military attack, but it must also defend RMI from all threats to its secu-
rity. The loss of land from rising sea levels could be construed as a threat
to RMI security.
First, Section 311 does not condition the United States' obligation to
defend RMI on the type of threat.' In looking at the body of the Com-
pact, it is clear this was a conscious choice of the drafters. The drafters
explain that the United States will defend RMI "as the United States and
its citizens are defended."'' This interpretation is bolstered by the legis-
lative history of the Compact. The Senate Report notes that Section 311
has a broad defensive purpose.'74 "Of fundamental significance is the
undertaking of the United States during the free association relationship
to defend [RMI] and their citizens as the United States and its citizens
are defended."'73
A simple comparison demonstrates the legitimacy of a call on the
United States to defend RMI from the threat of inundation. In the worst
case, the IPCC projects that RMI may lose 80% of its most populated
land mass in the next 100 years.'76 If similar evidence indicated that the
United States would lose 80% of its land mass within the next 100 years,
the United States government would take action. Since the United States
would defend its own citizens, RMI can argue that Section 311 would
require United States' defense of RMI citizens.
Second, other provisions of the Compact confirm that the United
States is responsible not only for defending RMI against attack, but also
for providing general security for RMI. Section 313 requires RMI to
"refrain from actions" that the United States determines to be incompati-
ble with its "authority and responsibility for security and defense matters
(3) the option to establish and use military areas and facilities in the Mar-
shall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia, subject to the terms
of the separate agreements referred to in Sections 321 and 323.
(c) The Government of the United States confirms that it shall act in accor-
dance with the principles of international law and the Charter of the United
Nations in the exercise of this authority and responsibility.
Compact, supra note 160, § 311, at 1822.
172. See id.
173. Id. § 311(b)(1), at 1822.
174 See S. REP. No. 99-16, at 6, 20; see generally H.R. REP. No. 99-188, pt. 1, at 5
(1985).
175. S. REP. No. 99-16, at 20(emphasis added).
176. See Regional Impacts, supra note 1, pt. 6.8. The IPCC stated that 80 percent of the
Majuro Atoll is vulnerable from a one meter rise in sea level. By the year 2100, the IPCC
predicts a global mean sea level increase of 15-95 cm. Regional Impacts, supra note 1, pt.
6.8.
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in or relating to the Marshall Islands.... The Senate Report explains
that "[t]he purpose of this provision is to preserve the allocation of
authority and responsibility for domestic and foreign affairs to [RMI],
and for security and defense to the United States." ' The description of
the United States' obligation in Section 313 is not limited to foreign
military attack, but encompasses security in general . 79 The breadth of
this obligation is emphasized by RMI's agreement to refrain from those
acts that the United States deems incompatible with its obligations.'80
RMI would not have agreed to give up such a large portion of its sover-
eign control of foreign affairs if it had not been assured of substantial
protection in return.
Third, the. Compact is unlike the United States' other agreements,
which commit the United States to defend other nations only from a
military attack. For example Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty com-
pels the parties to defend against "an armed attack against one or more
of them in Europe or North America."'' Additionally, the Compact has
far reaching provisions that extend beyond the obligations that the
United States owes to NATO countries. Indeed, the Compact compels
the United States to treat RMI more like one of the fifty states than a
sovereign nation. For example, included in the supplemental agreements
to the Compact is a provision stating that "[a]ssistance under the Disas-
ter Relief Act of 1974 shall be made available to the Marshall Islands...
in the same manner as assistance is made available to a 'State.' , 82 The
Compact includes additional obligations that emphasize the parallel
treatment given United States and RMI citizens. An RMI citizen may
establish residence in the United States and work as a nonimmigrant
without facing many of the obstacles that citizens from other countries
must overcome.'83 Further, a citizen of RMI may serve in the United
States military. Since the United States has granted RMI citizens some
of the rights and privileges of United States citizens, it is understandable
that the United States would also defend RMI citizens as it would also
defend its own.
177. Compact, supra note 160, § 313, at 1822 (emphasis added).
178. S. REP. No. 99-16, at 20.
179. See generally id.
180. See S. REP. No. 99-16, at 20.
181. Philip Bobbitt et al., Structuring a New Security Regime In Europe: Proceedings of
the Eighty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 85 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PRoc. 277, 280 (199 1)(citing NATO)(emphasis added).
182. S. REP. No. 99-16, at 241(1985).
183. See Compact, supra note 160, § 141, at 1804.
184. See Compact, supra note 160, § 341-42, at 1825.
Spring 20001
Michigan Journal of International Law
Fourth, the obligation to defend RMI from accelerated sea-level rise
is consistent with the history of the trustee relationship between the
United States and the Marshall Islands, which indicates that a broad
interpretation of the Compact is appropriate. Since 1947, the United
States has purported to be the protector and guardian of the Marshall
Islands.'85 While the trustee relationship ended in 1986, the fiduciary
responsibility arguably continues."' The ICJ has not determined whether
a fiduciary relationship among former Trustee Administrators exists
beyond the termination of the trust, but Australia settled a case to avoid
facing such a ruling."7 Therefore, as a former trustee, the United States
may have a de facto fiduciary responsibility to protect RMI. At the very
least, the former trustee relationship supports a broad interpretation of
the United States' current obligations to its former trustee nation.
Finally, RMI has paid for the promise of United States' protection in
the Compact. First, in exchange for the Compact, RMI settled five bil-
lion dollars in claims against the United States nuclear testing program'
for one hundred and fifty million dollars.'89 The Compact also freed the
United States from the Trust, saving the United States hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in Trustee administrative costs.' 9 Further, RMI promised
the United States access to RMI for ballistic missile testing." ' By agree-
ing to the Compact, RMI also provided the United States with the
support of many allies in the region.9 2 A House Report noted that im-
provements in the RMI citizens' quality of life benefited the United
States by preventing "Soviet subversion in the region."' 93 The United
States clearly has received many benefits under the Compact, and the
United States should fulfill its obligations under the Compact as well.
Therefore, RMI has several grounds to argue that the Compact re-
quires a United States defense to accelerated sea-level rise. The United
185. See generally Lee, supra note 157, at 403-408.
186. For an examination of the fiduciary responsibility of a former Trustee nation, see
Antony Anghie "The Heart of My Home:" Colonialism, Environmental Damage, and the
Nauru Case, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 445 (1993); see also Ramon E. Reyes, Jr., Nauru v. Austra-
lia: The International Fiduciary Duty and the Settlement of Nauru's Claims for Rehabilitation
of Its Phosphate Lands, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 1 (1996).
187. See supra note 186.
188. For a general treatment on the impacts of the United States' nuclear testing pro-
gram, see JANE DIBBLIN, DAY OF Two SUNS: US NUCLEAR TESTING AND THE PACIFIC
ISLANDERS (1988).
189. See H.R. REP. No. 99-188, pt. 1, at 5 (1985).
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. Id.
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States may want to dispute this interpretation. The Compact has dispute
resolution procedures that can resolve such disagreements."9
CONCLUSION
The data concerning accelerated sea-level rise and increasing emis-
sions of GHG show a direct threat to the long-term existence of RMI.
Action must be taken to ensure the survival of RMI. Diplomatic efforts
are clearly a crucial part of RMI's strategy. However, due to the magni-
tude of the threat, diplomatic efforts alone are not sufficient. RMI has at
least three options for enforcing legal obligations that may give it more
immediate relief. If RMI is to exercise the options outlined in this Note,
it must give some care to the order in which steps are taken to ensure the
most favorable outcome.
While bringing an immediate action in the ICJ for the breach of
customary international law may be an appealing, dramatic, and forceful
measure, it seems wiser to hold this option in reserve until the other two
have been exhausted.195 The request for adaptation funds under Article
4(4) of the UNFCCC is the most time sensitive of the three options. If
RMI is the first to make a request under Article 4(4) for relocation
funding, RMI sets the agenda for the debate over the scope of Article
4(4). Further, if RMI's request under Article 4(4) is rejected, that rejec-
tion may actionable in the ICJ. Bringing a suit before the ICJ would be
much more appropriate after the claim for adaptation funds has been re-
jected. Such a suit, based on the breach of a treaty obligation, is more
likely to be favorably received by the ICJ. Additionally, RMI can
strengthen its position by combining the causes of action stemming from
both the treaty and customary law violations.
Concurrent with the pursuit of adaptation funds under Article 4(4),
RMI should request relief from the United States under the Compact.
While the United States will resist the broad interpretation of the obliga-
tion to defend RMI, any increased involvement by the United States is
likely to be beneficial. Further, the strategy of enforcing the Compact to
defend RMI has more potential for success than any hostile legal action
brought against the United States for its role as a main producer of GHG.
By utilizing the Compact, RMI avoids asking the United States to take
194. These procedures will not take RMI before the ICJ. After an effort is made to re-
solve the dispute among the parties, Section 424 provides an arbitration mechanism to settle
disputes under the Compact. See Compact, supra note 160, § 424, at 1828.
195. Note that RMI must accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ before initiating
any action against the defendant parties. See supra pt. H.A.
Spring 20001
522 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 21:495
responsibility for GHG emissions. RMI is simply asking the United
States to defend it from the threat of accelerated sea-level rise.
Finally, those pursuing the enforcement of these legal obligations for
RMI can capitalize on the symbolic significance of RMI's claim. The
story of an entire nation's destruction has the potential to awaken the
world to the real dangers of climate change. The actions outlined in this
paper can be coordinated with public relations campaigns sponsored by
environmental organizations. Media coverage will enhance political
pressure to find a remedy for the citizens of RMI, who are suffering at
the hands of the industrialized world. The combination of public expo-
sure, diplomatic pressure, and international legal obligations may be
enough to turn the tide, if not literally, then at least enough to compel
compensation for the Marshallese people.
